Following the 1961 inauguration, the Kennedy Administration soon experienced its first true crisis. Significant Cold War tensions a few years earlier compelled the Eisenhower Administration to draft a Cuban invasion plan. Included would be exiled Cuban nationals along with members of the U.S. Military in the attempt to fuel insurgence among the population ostensibly leading to toppling the Castro regime. It was thought such a revolt, if successful, would also hinder Soviet influence in the West. Alas, the operation would prove to be a fiasco. Since the Kennedy Administration was complicit in approving the mission, it also had to bear the burden of its multi-faceted backlash. U.S. allies and adversaries alike were alienated by the aim of the invasion, airing their unanimous disapproval.
The mission backfired to the extent that many lives were lost, including U.S. service personnel. The Cuban military and its people rallied around Castro. He and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev seized upon the badly-handled incident as further proof for a Russian alliance with Cuba. Presiding over a meeting with military leaders and the Cuban Revolutionary Council, what became clear was that weaponry used by Castro’s followers included Russian tanks and firepower. Speaking to a meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors days after the disaster, JFK tried to downplay the extent of U.S. military involvement, citing instead “freedom fighters” and “gallant refugees” as the leaders of the mission, even quoting Castro as saying the effort was spearheaded largely by mercenaries. Yet, concurrently, JFK stressed the need for continued vigilance against Communist activity in our hemisphere or in Southeast Asia. And resistance would be conducted in concert with other countries, not unilaterally. However, Kennedy conceded that a lesson for any such joint ventures emerged from the Bay of Pigs.
In their respective memoirs, speechwriters Theodore Sorensen and Arthur Schlesinger Jr portrayed Kennedy as a reluctant yet eventual agreeable party in the largely-CIA Cuban insurrection attempt. CIA involvement was considered a late breach instead of part of the initial plan. The highest levels of the military had been privy to the scheme during the later Eisenhower years. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA believed action in Cuba needed to be swift. So, the Kennedy loyalists viewed JFK as a victim of bad advice and all-too-human judgment. In any event, as investigative reporter Jack Anderson stated, the experience was enough for Kennedy not to trust the CIA afterward. Attorney General Bobby Kennedy added his hawkish ire to the hostility. Differences within governing agencies became personal. And such antipathy arguably lingered throughout JFK’s tenure. Meanwhile, Castro earned his niche as Kennedy’s main enemy in the Western Hemisphere. At a subsequent European summit, Kennedy and Khrushchev had a contentious encounter with Cuba obviously a major subject.
For his part, Kennedy continued to court the press. Just a week after the address to the Society of Newspaper Editors, he met with a similar organization. This time, however, while he lauded the practice of journalism in informing and enlightening the public, he was a bit more even-handed, wondering about boundaries and advising correspondents to pursue goals reflecting their patriotism and to be wary of compromising the national interest. Though Kennedy later stated the Bay of Pigs was no precedent for U.S. military activity in Cuba, he likely knew the incident was merely Round 1 in the struggle with their adversaries. And he hoped the media would not pursue leaks about what may be to come. After all, JFK sought control over the narrative for subsequent engagements.
In Part 2 of this series, tensions, among parties both internal and external, continue to escalate. And a broader perspective of the international strife is offered.
Hold Back The Nite 