Part 1 of this series focused on President John F Kennedy’s desire for the relatively-clandestine Cuban invasion mission to succeed, hoping failure would still allow for a degree of plausible deniability. The plan backfired miserably, leaving pervasive mistrust within the U.S. government. The Bay of Pigs is viewed widely as the biggest failure of the Administration. Unfortunately, it occurred early in Kennedy’s term, creating doubts about leadership and whether the new Commander-in-Chief possessed the experience and judgment to handle foreign affairs.
As was pointed out, the incident galvanized the Communist alliance between Cuba and the Soviets. Further, there was an impact on the perceived need to counteract Communist movement in Southeast Asia, with the U.S. dispatching more troops/”military advisers” to Vietnam. Given activity on many fronts, the Cuban hangover served as the catalyst for subsequent challenges between the U.S. and its ideological adversaries. Kennedy would be occupied by ongoing tests of his mettle in these developments. Oddly, Arthur Schlesinger Jr scoffed at a vendetta harbored by the Kennedys against Castro but does not deny their preoccupation with Cuba.
Further, scrutiny and criticism domestically from both political parties persisted. A discernible wave of suspicion would plague the Kennedy presidency. Critics on the right complained JFK was not taking sufficient action versus Cuba, while their counterparts on the left contended far too much attention was being directed toward the tiny island. Elsewhere, British philosopher Bertrand Russell’s hyperbolic characterization of Kennedy’s hardline Cuban stance explicitly stated JFK was “worse than Hitler.”
But there was merit behind the Kennedy wariness regarding Cuban activity following the Bay of Pigs. By 1962, the Soviets did not dispute the presence of Russian-supplied missiles to Cuba. However, they insisted the weapons were intended as defensive in nature when confronted by aerial evidence of such bases in the country. It was a lie. Soviet Minister Andrei Gromyko purposely misled President Kennedy when direct questions about the purpose of the missiles were posed. Gromyko was not alone in the deception. Kennedy had received intelligence reports in the weeks just prior exhibiting naivete as it pertained to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. These reports refuted any notion Khrushchev would employ Cuba as a base of nuclear operations. Therefore, the U.S. needn’t prepare for the worst. In any event, if not for the failure at the Bay of Pigs, it is conceivable the Cuban Missile Crisis would not have materialized as it did. The seeds of 1961’s botched attempt were sadly sown in Fall 1962. Conversely, had the operation been successful, a tremendous setback would have been dealt to the Soviets, and Khrushchev, in particular.
Kennedy chose a defiant stance when he finally grasped that Khrushchev was not the rational and prudent he had encountered in Vienna. For reasons all his own, Khrushchev chose to gamble and use Castro and the Cuban nation for leverage. It can be argued the Soviet Premier, again underestimating JFK, had sought to enhance his status with the Politburo. He was eager to pursue high stakes. However, in the long run, he overplayed his hand. And the Cuban Missile Crisis became his Bay of Pigs.
Hold Back The Nite 